Welcome to Wider Europe, RFE/RL's newsletter focusing on the key issues concerning the European Union, NATO, and other institutions and their relationships with the Western Balkans and Europe's Eastern neighborhoods.

I'm RFE/RL Europe Editor Rikard Jozwiak, and this week I am drilling down on two big gatherings: The NATO summit in the Hague, followed by the EU summit in Brussels a day later.

Briefing #1: All You Need To Know Ahead Of The NATO Summit

What You Need To Know:NATO leaders will gather in The Hague on June 2425 with one key question looming: Can they agree on a hefty new defense spending target of 5 percent of GDP? The spotlight, however, will be firmly on US President Donald Trump.

Ahead of the Hague meeting, speculation had been mounting that he may skip the summit altogether, although the White House eventually confirmed he will be present.

The summit has essentially been designed to please the American leader and avoid any sign of disharmony in the club. Lingering fears remain of a repeat of the infamous 2018 NATO summit in Brussels, when Trump -- then in his first term -- threatened to pull the United States out of the alliance unless European countries and Canada significantly increased their defense outlays.

Since then, most allies have ramped up spending, with most now reaching the 2 percent target agreed in Wales in 2014, driven by a mix of American pressure and the war in Ukraine.

What was supposed to be a three-day-meeting in the Netherlands has now been reduced to a social dinner with spouses hosted by the Dutch king at one of the city's royal palaces on June 24, followed by a working session of the North Atlantic Council (NAC) the following day -- a meeting not even expected to last three hours. And that's it.

Deep Background:It is at the NAC session that leaders will agree on the so-called Hague Declaration. The document hasn't been finally approved yet, but earlier drafts RFE/RL has seen indicate it will be a short one.

While previous summit texts stretched several pages, touching upon all sorts of policy items, this one may only have as few as five paragraphs. Last year, it was 38 paragraphs with an additional six-point annex outlining security assistance for Ukraine. The key issue is the 5 percent defense spending target and when it should be reached.

Spanish Prime Minister Pedro Sanchez has already sent a letter to NATO Secretary-General Mark Rutte ahead of the meeting saying the target is unreasonable and asking for an exemption for Madrid. Just before the summit, Spain was given some flexibility by Rutte to reach the target.

The 5 percent target proposed by Rutte includes 3.5 percent for "hard" military spending on capabilities such as missiles, helicopters, and fighter jets. The other 1.5 percent has been earmarked for "resilience" -- a deliberately vague term for most member states as this spending can include pretty much anything.

Most are likely to spend it on infrastructure, however, to improve military mobility. And they may also include contributions to Kyiv here, with the draft document noting that "allies reaffirm their commitment to provide support to Ukraine and, to this end, will include direct contributions toward Ukraine's defense and its defense industry when calculating Allies' defense spending."

Drilling Down

• Disagreements also remain over the deadline for reaching the 5 percent target. Apart from the United States, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland, few are happy with 2032 as the target date, simply because they think it is impossible to meet this deadline.
• It now looks like 2035 will be the target instead. In any event, the declaration will include a reference to a review of the target in 2029.
• It has not been lost on NATO officials that this date comes a year after the next US presidential elections, even though they have been quick to insist that this is simply the halfway mark between now and 2032.
• To the relief of European allies, NATO's mutual defense clause -- Article 5 -- is referenced in the draft declaration amid persistent fears that Washington wasn't truly committed to coming to the aid of the other 31 allies if they were attacked. Russia is also mentioned in the text as a "long-term threat" to Euro-Atlantic security.
• The document will also reference transatlantic industrial cooperation, a nod to Washington's interest in ensuring US companies also benefit from a European defense splurge.
• Furthermore, it reveals next year's summit will be in Turkey followed by a meeting in Albania. Turkey has long sought to host a NATO summit, but several alliance members have for years been reluctant due to the ongoing crackdown on the Turkish opposition. Now, with Ankara's growing geopolitical clout, from the Middle East to Ukraine, that ambition will finally be realized in 2026.
• Another major uncertainty is how prominently Ukraine will feature at the upcoming summit. Kyiv's NATO membership aspirations were headline topics at the Vilnius summit in 2023 and again in Washington a year later, but talk about this has died down since Trump publicly dismissed the country's chances of joining.
• There is no mention of Ukraine's potential membership in the draft Hague texts, with some NATO diplomats telling RFE/RL under condition of anonymity they believe omitting any mention is better than including a watered-down version of the language from the Vilnius and Washington communiques, which at least promised future membership.
• With no formal NATO-Ukraine Council slated for the summit at the leaders' level, NATO foreign ministers will instead have something of a compensatory dinner on June 24 in the presence of their Ukrainian counterpart, Andriy Sybiha.
• Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy will also be in The Hague to attend the leaders' social dinner, an event that NATO's Indo-Pacific partners -- Australia, Japan, New Zealand, and South Korea -- are also due to attend.
• Zelenskyy may also take part in some sidebar events at the summit, such as the NATO defense industry forum. There may also be a "mini summit" on Ukraine with Rutte and other European leaders after the formal NATO meeting is over.

Briefing #2: And The EU summit In Brussels

What You Need To Know:A day after the NATO summit in The Hague ends, EU leaders will take the short journey south to Brussels for their regular summer European Council. Kicking off on the morning of June 26, this summit may continue into the next day as there are plenty of items on the agenda -- most notably Iran, where the EU is struggling to stay relevant. According to the Brussels diplomats I have spoken with, however, the bloc stillaims to act as a conduit for potential direct talksbetween the United States and Tehran.

That said, there are also several key political decisions on the table -- especially concerning Ukraine. When Poland took over the six-month rotating presidency of the Council of the European Union with much pomp and circumstance at the start of the year, the stated goal was that formal EU accession talks would start with Ukraine and Moldova during the first six months of 2025. Polish diplomats had even confidently voiced hopes that more than one of the six negotiating clusters would be opened during their chairmanship. It's fair to say that things have not panned out as expected.

Deep Background:Unanimity is needed for every cluster to be opened, and Hungary has persistently blocked any move to this effect, even conducting a widely criticized consultative referendum on Ukrainian EU membership.

This summit is something of a "last chance saloon" to unblock the situation, but few diplomats believe Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban will give it much thought. Some think that maybe things will get moving on this issue after the summit in July when Denmark takes over the presidency.

However, since this has increasingly become a domestic political issue in Hungary, most believe Budapest will continue vetoing progress until the country's parliamentary elections in April 2026.

As regards Ukraine and Moldova, the draft summit declaration seen by RFE/RL states that "the European Council looks forward to the next steps in the accession process in line with the merit-based approach, with clusters being opened when the conditions are met."

The key question now is whether Ukraine and Moldova should be separated in the accession process, as none of the 27 EU member states appears opposed to allowing Chisinau to proceed. Several member states, however, are reluctant to green-light this "decoupling" as they don't want to "succumb to Hungarian blackmail," as they put it, and believe the pair should continue together on the road to membership.

On the other hand, the EU also wants to give Moldova a carrot, with thefirst-ever EU-Moldova summit in early Julyand what are expected to be tightly fought parliamentary elections in September.

Drilling Down

• The most likely scenario, however, is that all preparatory work on the accession talks will continue in the hope that every cluster can be opened once there is approval from everyone.
• For now, the most likely candidate to show concrete progress at the end of June is Montenegro, which is expected to close a cluster of chapters on June 27.
• So much for the "EU enlargement momentum" that eurocrats have so often keenly propagated in previous years. If there is one area where Hungary -- and increasingly Slovakia -- may be more willing to move forward, it's sanctions against Russia.
• There are two decisions to be taken on sanctions: the newly proposed18th round of restrictive measuresand the six-month rollover of all sanctions imposed on the Kremlin since the full-scale invasion of Ukraine nearly three years ago.
• Several European diplomats have indicated there might be something of a quid pro quo during the summit, whereby both sanctions decisions will be adopted, but it will be generally accepted that Ukraine cannot move forward on the accession path for now.
• For most officials, the most important thing is to get an extension of all the previous sanctions.
• This includes all frozen Russian assets in the bloc, totaling over 200 billion euro ($230 billion).
• Hungary was toying with the idea of not a giving thumbs-up to the prolongation last time around in January, but officials think it won't be too dramatic this time, with Russia's increased attacks on Ukrainian civilian targets making any calls for potential peace talks moot.
• The fact that the actual deadline for the extension isn't till the end of July means most people RFE/RL has spoken are confident that something can be worked out.
• For the 18th sanctions package, most things have been agreed on a diplomatic level already.
• This is not too surprising, as most of the blacklistings and proposals -- such as de-SWIFTing Russian banks and sanctioning Nord Stream 1 and 2 -- have been relatively uncontroversial.
• Quick approval is also more likely now that the headline proposal to lower the Russian oil price cap from $60 to $45 per barrel appears unlikely to gain traction.
• The United States didn't get onboard with this idea at the recent Group of Seven summit, and few believe that the EU -- even with potential political support from allies such as Britain and Canada -- is willing or able to lower the cap without Washington.

Looking Ahead

On June 25, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy will be in Strasbourg to sign the final document establishing a new tribunal investigating the Russian crimes of aggression against Ukraine. The new court has been in the works ever since the full-scale invasion of the country over three years and will now be one step closer to realization.

That's all for this week!

Feel free to reach out to me on any of these issues on X @RikardJozwiak, or on e-mail [email protected].

Until next time,

Rikard Jozwiak

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